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1 Introduction.
The literature on Industrial Organization emphasizes the role of threats and retaliations
in a dynamic game framework to explain tacit collusion (Friedman, 1971; Abreu, 1986;
Benoit and Krishna, 1987; Feuerstein, 2005). This paper gives an example of a market
in which the collusive outcome arises as a predictable result of a non-repeated price
competition duopoly with two stages. This is consistent with the experimental findings
of a remarkable degree of coordination around a collusive price by two firms (Abbink
and Brandts, 2008). Following Ivaldi et al. (2003), tacit collusion needs not to involve
any collusion in the legal sense, and, in particular, no communication between the
parties. “It is referred to as tacit collusion only because the outcome (in terms of prices
set or quantities produced, for example) may well resemble that of explicit collusion or
even of an official cartel”.
We start from the Bertrand competition model initiated by Dastidar (1995)1 and
extended recently by Baye and Morgan (2002); Novshek and Chowdhury (2003); Ho-
ernig (2007); Bagh (2010). In this setting, firms face convex costs and are committed to
satisfying the full demand. By lowering its price, a firm increases its revenue by higher
sales. But, costs being convex, they will increase even more, making this deviation
non-profitable. For this reason, a continuum of prices above the competitive price can
be sustained as Nash equilibria in pure strategies2, inducing a coordination problem in
a non-repeated framework. To claim the possibility of tacit collusion in this framework,
two questions still need to be answered: 1) Is the collusive outcome within the set of
the Nash equilibria? 2) Is there a plausible selection procedure to achieve the collusive
outcome as the unique solution? Dastidar (2001) answers the first question, but only
in the symmetric case. As far as we know, the second question has not been treated
explicitly.
According to Harsanyi and Selten (1988), two criteria can be used to solve the
coordination issue: The payoff dominance criterion which appears to be the natural
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criterion when it is common knowledge that both players are fully rational3, and the
risk dominance criterion that can be invoked when payoff dominance is insufficient to
provide uniqueness. Unfortunately, risk dominance may not be applied in the context
of Bertrand competition with convex costs, because of the infinity of equilibria.
In this paper, we will add a sequential choice of production factors into Dastidar’s
(1995) approach of Bertrand competition. As we will demonstrate, this plays a key role
in the coordination mechanism that leads to tacit collusion. Our model starts from a
constant returns to scale production function with two substitutable production factors
chosen sequentially. In the first stage, the firms invest i.e. they choose the quantity of
the fixed factors, quantity that will be invariable over the second stage. In the second
stage, firms compete on price and determine the quantity of variable factors needed
to satisfy the demand they will face. This implies that, when the first factor is fixed,
the short run marginal cost is convex in the second stage4. The sequential choice of
the production factors is certainly the central hypothesis of our approach. On the one
hand, it is a standard hypothesis in economic analysis, a textbook case renewing the
Marshallian tradition of distinguishing between short and long term cost functions. On
the other hand, as far as we know, it appears that it has not been used in the recent
literature about price competition. However, we want to point out that this assumption
is a natural generalization of the notion of capacity constraints initiated by Edgeworth
(1925). There is a long tradition in Industrial Organization of considering firms that
are capacity constrained (Vives, 1980; Kreps and Scheinkman, 1983; Allen and Hellwig,
1986; Davidson and Deneckere, 1986; Allen et al., 2000). In those models, the constraint
is drastic (i.e. it is impossible to produce above the capacity). In our model, the choice
of the fixed factor corresponds to the choice of the production capacity. But the usual
way to model capacity constraints is equivalent, in our setting, with an assumption of
perfect complementarity of fixed and variable factors. In this case, when the capacity
of production is binding in the second stage, it is impossible to produce more, whatever
the quantity of variable factor. Our hypothesis of substitutability between fixed and
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variable factors introduces a less drastic (soft) notion of capacity constraints5, and in
many cases a more realistic one. For example, we can take, as an illustration, the
retailing sector. The fixed factor refers to the surface needed to sell and the length of
the shelves used to display the products, whereas the variable factor can be interpreted
as the number of employees needed to fill up the shelves. For a given surface of the
store, there exists an optimal number of employees minimizing the long-term average
cost. But if demand is superior to the output corresponding to this optimal number,
the shelves will be emptied more quickly, and you will need more employees to fill up
the shelves continuously and to satisfy this supplementary demand.
In this paper, we will show that the standard selection criterion of payoff dominance
is not sufficient to assure uniqueness of equilibrium. But if we add our notion of
soft capacity constraint, the uniqueness is guaranteed in the two-stage game and the
equilibrium chosen is a collusive one.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Reasoning back-
wards, the second stage of the game is solved in Section 3 and the first one in Section
4. The final section concludes.
2 The model.
There are two identical firms in a market for a homogeneous good. Consider a two-
stage game where firms invest in the first stage and simultaneously choose the price in
the second stage. We introduce the following assumptions:
1. Firms rely on a technology represented by a two-factor constant returns to scale
production function. The first factor is fixed in the second stage, while the
second one varies to satisfy the demand faced by the firm6. For the firm i, the
fixed factor will be denoted zi and the variable one, vi. The fixed factor price
is w1, and the variable one is w2. For readability, we will use a Cobb-Douglas
production function yi = azi
αv1−αi with i = 1, 2 and i 6= j, where a is a positive
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constant, and α, the elasticity of the production according to the level of the fixed
factor, is a constant between 0 and 1. The total cost function can be written.
C(yi; zi; vi) = w1zi + w2vi = w1zi + w2
yi
1
1−α
a
1
1−α zi
α
1−α
Viewed from the second stage, the first term of the righthand side is sunk and
the second term is the short-run cost function. It is continuous, increasing and
convex.
2. The demand is continuous, twice differentiable and decreasing.
D : R+ −→ R+ with D(pmax) = 0, D(0) = Qmax. Classically, we denote the price
elasticity of demand: E(p) = pD
′(p)
D(p)
.
3. Firms have to supply all the demand they face. The demand function is defined
as follows:
Di(pi; pj) =


0 if pi > pj
1
2
D(pi) if pi = pj
D(pi) if pi < pj
We can now express the profit πi for each firm i.
πi(pi, pj, zi) = pDi(pi, pj)− Ci (Di(pi, pj), zi)
πi(pi, pj, zi) =


−w1zi if pi > pj
pD(p)
2
− w1zi − w2
(D(p)2 )
1
1−α
a
1
1−α zi
α
1−α
def
= πˆ(p, zi) if pi = pj = p
pD(p)− w1zi − w2
D(p)
1
1−α
a
1
1−α zi
α
1−α
def
= π(p, zi) if pj > pi = p
The function πˆ(p, zi) represents the profit of the firm i when both firms quote
the same price and the function π(p, zi), represents the profit of firm i when it
quotes the lowest price and supplies the market alone.
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4. The demand is such that πˆ(p, zi) and π(p, zi) are strictly concave in p and strictly
concave in z, i. e. ∂2πˆ(p, z)/∂p2 < 0, ∂2πˆ(p, z)∂z2 < 0, ∂2π(p, z)/∂p2 < 0,
∂2π(p, z)∂z2. After trivial calculations, it can be shown that ∂2πˆ(p, z)/∂p∂z < 0.
We define p¯i(zi) that solves πˆ(p, zi) = π(p, zi). Thus p¯i(zi) must be interpreted as the
critical price for which the firm is indifferent between operating in the market alone or
with its competitor. After calculation, we obtain
p¯i(zi) =
w2
a
1
1−α zi
α
1−α
(
D(p¯i)
2
) α
1−α
(2
1
1−α − 1) (1)
In the second stage, the fixed cost, w1zi, is sunk, and the firm will quote a price only
if the variable part of the profit is positive i. e. πˆ(p, zi) ≥ −w1zi. Thus, we also define
pˆi, that solves πˆ(p, zi) = −w1zi for a given zi, the minimum price compatible with a
decision to produce in the second stage.
pˆi(zi) =
w2
a
1
1−α zi
α
1−α
(
D(pˆi)
2
)
α
1−α (2)
Finally, we define p∗i , the price that maximises the profit of firm i when both firms
operate in the market. As a shortcut, this price can be interpreted as the cartel price
when both firms have chosen the same level of fixed factors in the first stage.
p∗i (zi)
def
= argmax
p
{πˆ(p, zi)} =
1
1 + 1
E(p∗
i
)
1
1− α
w2
a
1
1−α zi
α
1−α
(
D(p∗i )
2
)
α
1−α (3)
Let us note that, for a given zi, p
∗(zi) is different from p
m(zi), the monopoly price
which maximises the profit of a firm alone in the market.
In the rest of the paper, when reasoning with a given zi, we will denote πˆ(p, zi) =
πˆi(p) and π(p, zi) = πi(p).
It is important to understand how those profit functions πˆ(p, zi) and π(p, zi) and
those prices pˆ, p∗ and p¯ are organized together.
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Lemma 1 (Geometry of profit functions for a given zi).
pˆi < p¯i (4a)
∀p > pˆi, πˆi(p) > −w1zi (4b)
∀p ∈ [pˆi; p¯i], ∀µ ∈ (0, p], πˆi(p) > πi(p) > πi(p− µ) (4c)
zi > zj ⇒


pˆj > pˆi
p¯j > p¯i
p∗j > p
∗
i
(4d)
Proof : Following equations (1), (2) and (3), (4a),(4b),(4c) are obvious. Taking the
total differential of expressions (1), (2) and (3), we can show that ∀z, dpˆ(z)/dz < 0,
dp¯(z)/dz < 0 and dp∗(z)/dz < 0, proving (4d). 
The prices p¯(z) and p∗(z) will play an important role in the resolution of the game
and we have to settle the question of their relative position.
Lemma 2 (Comparison between p¯(z) and p∗(z)).
∀α ∈ (0, 1), ∃!z˜,
z = z˜ ⇔ p¯(z) = p∗(z) ≡ p˜⇔
1
1− α
1
2
1
1−α − 1
= 1 +
1
E(p˜)
(5a)
z < z˜ ⇔ p¯(z) > p∗(z)⇔
1
1− α
1
2
1
1−α − 1
< 1 +
1
E(p¯(z))
(5b)
Proof : in the appendix. 
z˜ is exogenous, only determined by the special form of the demand and production
functions. If the firm chooses a level of z lower than z˜, then p¯(z) will be above p∗(z).
However, if the firm chooses a higher level, then p¯(z) will be lower than p∗(z). So when
solving the first stage of the game, z will be endogenous, and we have to keep in mind
the qualitative implications for the resolution of the second stage. For a given demand
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function, α is the sole determinant of p˜ position. When α tends to 1, the condition
(5-b) is more easily satisfied.
p
i
pˆ
i
pi
i
p( )
p
maxpi*
pi
i
p( )
p
i
pˆ
i
pi
i
p( )
p
maxpi*
pi
i
p( )
Figure 1: z > z~ z < z~Figure 2:
pii
pi
i
Figure 1 and Figure 2 illustrate the geometry of the profit functions. Considering
just one firm with a definite level of the fixed factor, (4a), (4b) and (4c) allow us to
draw the functions πˆi(p) and πi(p).
These functions are parameterized by the level of the fixed factors. What happens
if this level increases? (4d) shows that the curves will be transformed with pˆj, p¯j and
p∗ moving to the left.
The two-stage game is solved by backward induction. First, we analyze the price
competition in the second stage of the game, for a given fixed input at levels z1 and
z2. Secondly, the firms optimally choose their fixed input levels in the first stage of the
game.
3 The second stage of the game: price competition
In this section, we take the firms’ fixed input levels as given and look for the Nash
equilibrium in prices. Thus, to simplify the exposition, we omit the z variable when
denoting the price. For reasons that will become clearer when we resolve the first stage
of the game in the next section, we will consider the possibility that z1 and z2, chosen
in the first stage, can be different but ”not too much”. More precisely, we will assume
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that z1 and z2 are such that [pˆ1, p¯1] ∩ [pˆ2, p¯2] 6= ∅.
3.1 Nash Equilibria
Proposition 1. In the second stage, (p1, p2) is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium if and
only if p1 = p2 = p
N , with pN ∈ [pˆ1, p¯1] ∩ [pˆ2, p¯2] = [max(pˆ1, pˆ2),min(p¯1, p¯2)] 6= ∅.
Proof : in the appendix 
The Nash equilibrium prediction in the second stage game is basically the one of
Dastidar (1995), with the same drawback. With the exception of the very special
case p¯i = pˆj, in which there is a unique Nash equilibrium, all the other cases are
characterized by an infinite number of equilibria, with a minimum zero short-term
profit equilibrium price and a maximum above the competitive price.
3.2 Equilibrium selection
In this subsection, we will use payoff dominance criterion to reduce the set of equilibria
and discuss the uniqueness problem. An equilibrium point is said to be payoff-dominant
if it is not strictly dominated by an other equilibrium point, i.e. there exists no other
equilibrium in which payoffs are higher for all players.
Proposition 2. In the second stage, (p1, p2) is a payoff-dominant pure strategy Nash
equilibrium if and only if: p1 = p2 = p
PDN ,
with pPDN ∈ I = [max(pˆ1, pˆ2,min(p
∗
1, p
∗
2, p¯1, p¯2)),min(max(p
∗
1, p
∗
2), p¯1, p¯2)]
Proof : in the appendix 
Proposition 2 reduces the set of predictable outcomes of the game but does not imply
uniqueness. However, the following corollaries will prove that uniqueness prevails in
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some important cases. They will also provide a better understanding of Proposition 2.
Corollary 2-A. When firms have chosen the same level of factor z then p∗1 = p
∗
2
def
= p∗,
p¯1 = p¯2
def
= p¯ and the symmetric profile (min(p∗, p¯),min(p∗, p¯)) is the unique payoff-
dominant pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the second stage of the game.
Corollary 2-B. When firms have not chosen the same level of factor z and max(z1, z2) >
z˜, then there exists i ∈ {1, 2} such that p¯i = min(p
∗
1, p
∗
2, p¯1, p¯2) and the symmetric pro-
file (p¯i, p¯i) is the unique payoff-dominant pure strategy Nash equilibrium at the second
stage of the game.
Corollary 2-C. When firms have not chosen the same level of factor z and max(z1, z2) <
z˜ and p¯i 6= pˆj then there exists i ∈ {1, 2} such that p
∗
i = min(p
∗
1, p
∗
2, p¯1, p¯2) and the inter-
val I is an non degenerated continuum of payoff-dominant pure strategy Nash equilibria
in the second stage of the game.
Corollary 2-D. When p¯i = pˆj then the symmetric profile (p¯i, p¯i)) is the unique (payoff-
dominant) pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the second stage of the game.
The following Table presents the results of the price competition in the different
configurations.
min(p¯1, p¯2) 6 min(p
∗
1, p
∗
2)
⇔ max(z1, z2) > z˜
min(p¯1, p¯2) > min(p
∗
1, p
∗
2)
⇔ max(z1, z2) < z˜
z1 = z2
2A
Stage 2: Uniqueness
pPDN = p¯1 = p¯2 ≡ p¯
2A
Stage 2: Uniqueness
pPDN = p∗1 = p
∗
2 ≡ p
∗
z1 6= z2
2B
Stage 2: Uniqueness
pPDN = min(p¯1, p¯2)
2C (if p¯i 6= pˆj)
Stage 2: Multiplicity
pPDN ∈ I
2D (if p¯i = pˆj)
Stage 2: Uniqueness
pPDN = min(p¯1, p¯2)
Table 1: The different cases of price competition.
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Figures 3 and 4 illustrate respectively Case 2B and 2C.
pp1
pˆ
1
p
maxp1*
pi
1
p( )
pp2
pˆ
2
pi
2
p( )
p
maxp
2
*
pi
2
p( )
p
pN
pPDN
pi
1
pi
2
pi
1
p( )
Figure 3: Case 2B
pp1pˆ1
pi
1
p( )
p
max
p
1
*
pi
1
p( )
pp2
pˆ
2
pi
2
p( )
p
maxp2*
pi
2
p( )
p
pN
pi
2
pi
1
pPDN
Figure 4: Case 2C
The payoff dominance criterion is insufficient to achieve the solution’s uniqueness in
the second stage. The corollary 2-C shows that the coordination problem (multiplicity
of equilibria) follows from the profits geometry. But the corollary 2-A shows that the
coordination problem may be solved in the endogenous way by the agents’ decisions
upstream, whatever the special values of the parameters.
4 The first stage of the game
In this section, firms determine their level of fixed factors anticipating the effect on
the price equilibria at the second stage of the game. As we are in price competition,
the profit function of the first stage of the game inherits the potential discontinuity
of the profit function in the second stage of the game. Thus, for each outcome of the
game, we will have to look for the consequences of unilateral deviation in z on the profit
function. Two problems may arise. First, we have to consider the potential asymmetry
between the effect of a deviation in z on the market price, i.e. it is the fixed factor level
of the firm with the highest one that alone determines the market price. Secondly, a
deviation in the level of the fixed factors can also modify the nature of the equilibrium
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because, as we have shown in Lemma 2, the relative position of p¯(z) and p∗(z) depends
on the position of z according to z˜. So, before explicitly resolving the equilibrium in
the first stage of the game, we have to go back to the geometry of the profit function.
4.1 The geometry of the profit function, once again
Let us define: Π∗(z)
def
= πˆ(p¯(z), z) and Π∗∗(z)
def
= πˆ(p∗(z), z). We define, z∗ = argmax{Π∗(z)}
and z∗∗ = argmax{Π∗∗(z)}. Finally, we define the function Π(z) satisfying:


Π(z) = Π∗∗, ∀z ∈ (0, z˜]
Π(z) = Π∗, ∀z ∈ (z˜,+∞)
Π(z) characterizes the profit function of both firm when they choose the same level of
fixed factor. When z > z˜, it also characterizes the profit of the firm with the highest
level of fixed factor.
Lemma 3 (Geometry of the profit function).
dΠ∗
dz
(z) =
∂πˆ
∂p
(p¯(z), z)
dp¯
dz
(z) +
∂πˆ
∂z
(p¯(z), z) (6a)
dΠ∗∗
dz
(z) =
∂πˆ
∂z
(p∗(z), z) (6b)
∀z 6= z˜,Π∗∗(z) > Π∗(z) (6c)
Π∗∗(z˜) = Π∗(z˜)and
dΠ∗∗
dz
(z˜) =
dΠ∗
dz
(z˜) =
∂πˆ
∂z
(p∗(z˜), z˜) (6d)
Proof : (6a) is obtained by taking the total differential of the definition. For (6b)
and (6c), we use the fact that p∗(z) maximise πˆ(p, z) for a given z. (6d) is straightfor-
ward. 
The relative position of z∗ and z∗∗, on the one hand, with z˜, on the other hand,
will depend on the property of the demand function and the value of the elasticity
of the production according to the level of the fixed factor (the parameter α). We
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can have two cases: z∗ > z˜ (it will also hold for z∗∗) or z∗ 6 z˜. Both cases are
possible and are illustrated respectively in Figures 6-a and 6-b. For example, with a
linear demand function, case 6-a occurs when α is low. Those figures also illustrate the
general property enunciated in Lemma 3.
z
~ z
Figure 5-a: > Figure 5-b:
z*
Π(z)
Π   (z)**
Π   (z)**
Π (z)*
Π (z)*
Π(z)
z
~z* z** z**
z* z~ z~z*
z
We can now solve the first stage of the game.
4.2 Equilibrium prediction for the first stage game
The cases 5-a and 5-b determine the equilibrium prediction of the first stage game.
Proposition 3. There exists a unique payoff dominant pure strategy Nash equilibrium
in the first-stage of the game.
i) If z∗ > z˜ (Fig. 6-a), there exists an infinity of pure strategy Nash equilibria in the
first-stage of the game, with (z∗, z∗) the unique payoff dominant one.
ii) If z∗ 6 z˜ (Fig. 6-b), there exists an infinity of pure strategy Nash equilibria in the
first-stage of the game with (z∗∗, z∗∗) the unique payoff dominant one.
Proof : in the appendix 
Three points have to be noticed. First, the equilibrium prediction of the first stage
is unique. Even if there is a multiplicity of Nash Equilibria in this setting, the payoff
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dominance criterion is sufficient to achieve uniqueness. Secondly, the equilibrium pre-
diction of the first stage is symmetric i.e. the firms choose the same level of the fixed
factors. It implies that the cases 2B and 2C (Table 1) never occur in the second stage.
The choice of the level of the fixed factor allows the firms to endogenously solve the
problem of coordination in the second stage. When considering the whole game, we
can now predict a unique outcome price in the second stage. The sequential choice of
the production factors is thus, by itself, a powerful mean of coordination. However,
and it will be our last point, the qualitative properties of the equilibrium prediction for
the whole game depend on the geometry of the profit function (the relative position of
z∗ and z˜). As we have shown, this geometry is determined by the shape of the demand
function and the convexity of the short-term cost function, captured by the parameter
α. Proposition 3 distinguishes two cases. For a given demand function and for a given
α (possibly low), both firms choose z∗ in the first stage and quote p¯(z∗). For other
values of α (possibly high), both firms choose z∗∗ in the first stage and quote p∗(z∗∗).
Thus, it appears that firms coordinate on a ”high price”. Let us now examine if this
price corresponds to a collusive one.
4.3 The collusive nature of the equilibrium
We define the collusive outcome as the solution of the joint-profit maximization pro-
gram of two firms equally sharing the production. Because it is impossible for firms to
legally enforce an explicit agreement, we add a constraint of non-profitable deviation.
This program can be written:


max
p,z
2πˆ(p, z)
s.t. p ≤ p¯(z)
As a simple application of the envelope theorem, and because of the geometry of the
profit function, the results are as follows. When the constraint is binding, the solution
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of joint-profit maximization problem is (z∗, p¯(z∗)), which corresponds to a second best
from the point of view of the firms. When the constraint is slack, (z∗∗, p∗(z∗∗)) is the
solution, corresponding to the cartel capacity and price.
Thus, the unique equilibrium prediction of the whole game corresponds to a collusive
outcome. Our model provides a setting in which tacit collusion occurs in the sense
of Ivaldi et al. (2003), and this result is obtain in a non-repeated two-stage game
interaction. It is not the possibility of retaliation that drives the existence of tacit
collusion.
Dastidar (2001) has discussed the possibility for the collusive outcome to be a Nash
equilibrium of Bertand competition in a single-shot game. This paper goes further. Not
only because we prove that our solution is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, but
also because, combining a clear mechanism of equilibrium selection with a sequential
choice of production factors with soft capacity constraint, we show that tacit collusion
is the only predictable outcome of the whole game.
5 Conclusion
Our objective was to provide an example of a market in which tacit collusion can be
obtained as a predictable result of a non-repeated framework. To do this, we have built
a model with assumptions very close to the canonical textbook model of Bertrand com-
petition: price competition, non-repeated interaction, homogeneity, constant returns to
scale. Our only departure from this setting is that we rely on a two-factor production
function chosen sequentially.
The conventional wisdom, based on Bertrand’s original result, is to believe that
price competition is a much more drastic form of competition than quantity. Even if
there are few firms in the market, Bertrand’s result shows that some form of imperfect
competition can lead to marginal cost pricing and thus to social optimality. Since Edge-
worth (1925), there has been a long-standing debate on this statement. By bridging
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two important lines of this literature distinguished by Vives (1999), the Bertrand-
Edgeworth approach with capacity constraints, and that of convex costs (Dastidar,
1995), our paper is also a contribution to the resolution of the Bertrand Paradox.
An interesting property of our approach with a two-factor production function
is that it disentangles any assumption about returns to scale from the convexity of
marginal cost in the second stage. A natural extension of this paper would be to
consider a more general form of the production function with possibly various types
of returns-to-scale. This generalization would certainly be the proper framework to
study the effect of the number of firms at the equilibrium and particularly the way
this interacts with the mechanism of coordination in the first stage. Dastidar (2001)
has shown that, when costs are convex, the effect of the number of firms can be very
counter-intuitive, because the cost penalty incurred by a firm unilaterally lowering its
price is increased when more firms operate in the market. Obviously, in our two-stage
approach, the number of firms will also have an influence on the equilibrium value of
the fixed factor, and thus on the geometry of the profit function. Those effects will not
necessarily be trivial, especially if we consider various production functions and various
returns to scale. A related point is the influence of fixed costs on the equilibrium’s
existence as discussed recently by Saporiti and Coloma (2010), Dastidar (2011a) and
Dastidar (2011b). In our model, the cost of the fixed factor can be interpreted as a
fixed cost in the second stage. But, because this cost is sunk, it will have no effect on
the existence of the equilibrium.
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Appendix 1: Proof of Lemma 2
Let us remark that p∗ solves πˆ′(p) = 0. When p¯(z) = p∗(z)
def
= p˜, πˆ′(p¯) = 0. After cal-
culations, we get the right part of (5-a). Due to the strict concavity of πˆ according to
p (assumption (4)), we have : p¯(z) > p∗(z)⇔ πˆ′(p¯) < 0. After some easy calculations,
we then get the right part of (5b).
Let’s now prove the uniqueness of p˜ and z˜. The left hand side of the expression
1
1−α
1
2
1
1−α−1
= 1 + 1
E(p)
is a constant between 0 and 1. For p ∈ (0, pmax), the right hand
side is strictly increasing, taking values between −∞ and 1. That proves the unique-
ness of p˜. Because p¯(z) is strictly decreasing on its definition set, the uniqueness of p˜
implies the uniqueness of z˜. 
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Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 1
When we consider price competition, we can no longer resolve the game using the
reaction functions, because they are strongly discontinuous. Thus, we have to check
for each possible strategy profile whether it is a Nash equilibrium or not. Let’s first
investigate symmetric strategy profiles belonging to the interval. When the competitor
charges any price p ∈ [pˆi; p¯i], the best response for the firm i is to quote the same price.
When the firm i quotes the same price, it gets πˆi(p). We know that for all p > pˆi,
πˆi(p) > −TFC (see eq. (4b)). If the firm deviates (by quoting p−µ), it gets πi(p−µ).
We also know that for all p ∈ [pˆi; p¯i], πˆi(p) > πi(p) > πi(p − µ) (from eq (4c)). Since
the firm must supply all the demand it faces, the increase in additional revenue (from
higher sales) is less than the increase in costs: the firm must sell additional units at
excessive marginal costs. By quoting p + µ, the firm i obtains no demand and gets
zero variable profit. Hence it is optimal for each firm to quote the same price. There
are no incentives to deviate, which proves the implication in Proposition 1. It also
proves that all asymmetrical strategy profiles with at least one firm quoting a price in
the interval are not Nash equilibria. We now have to investigate all the other strategy
profiles, symmetric and asymmetric, in which none of the firms quote a price within
the interval. It is easy to check that for all symmetric or asymmetric strategy profiles
such that p < pˆ, the firm has interest to increase its price. The firm has interest to
lower its price for symmetric profiles with p > p¯. Finally, for asymmetric profiles with
p > p¯, the firm with the highest price will improve its profit in matching the other’s
price. Thus, asymmetric strategy profiles cannot be Nash Equilibria.
Appendix 3: Proof of Proposition 2
As shown in Proposition 1, all the Nash equilibria of the second stage are symmetric.
So we can, without loss of generality, consider only symmetric strategy profiles (p, p)
and the associated gains for both firms (πˆ1(p), πˆ2(p)).
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If we consider an open interval (pa, pb) such that, ∀p ∈ (pa, pb), ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, ∂πˆi(p)/∂p >
0, then the symmetric strategy profile (pb, pb) dominates all other profiles correspond-
ing to a price in the interval. Considering the geometry of the profit function, the
biggest open price interval with the profit of both firms being strictly increasing is
(0,min(p∗1, p
∗
2)). If we restrict ourselves to the set of Nash equilibria the biggest such
open interval is: I = (0, (min(p∗1, p
∗
2)))
⋂
{(pˆ1, p¯1) ∩ (pˆ2, p¯2)}
If max(pˆ1, pˆ2) ≥ min(p
∗
1, p
∗
2, p¯1, p¯2) then I = ∅.
If max(pˆ1, pˆ2) < min(p
∗
1, p
∗
2, p¯1, p¯2) then I = (max(pˆ1, pˆ2),min(p
∗
1, p
∗
2, p¯1, p¯2))
Thus, all symmetric profiles (p, p) such that p < max(pˆ1, pˆ2,min(p
∗
1, p
∗
2, p¯1, p¯2)) can-
not be payoff-dominant pure strategy Nash equilibria.
Reasoning the same way, we can define the biggest open price interval with the profit
of both firms being strictly decreasing and such that the symmetric strategy profiles
corresponding to those prices are Nash equilibria, (min(max(p∗1, p
∗
2), p¯1, p¯2),min(p¯1, p¯2)).
Thus all symmetric profiles (p, p) such that p > min(max(p∗1, p
∗
2), p¯1, p¯2) cannot be
payoff-dominant pure strategy Nash equilibria.
Finally, over the closed interval [max(pˆ1, pˆ2,min(p
∗
1, p
∗
2, p¯1, p¯2)),min(max(p
∗
1, p
∗
2), p¯1, p¯2)]
all symmetric profiles corresponding to those prices are Nash equilibria, with the profit
of both firms varying in the opposite way. 
Appendix 4: Proof of Proposition 3
For a purpose of readability, we will denote by the subscript h the firm with the
highest level of fixed factor, by the subscript l the one with the lowest level (i.e.
zh = max(z1, z2) > zl = min(z1, z2)). Let’s start by demonstrating Proposition 3 i).
Step 1: Asymmetric strategy profiles cannot be Nash equilibria of the first stage game.
a) If we are in the case (zl < zh < z˜) then the equilibria of the second stage are
characterized by the Corollary 2-C. Firms have a coordination problem. They are not
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able to predict the price in the second stage. But, by choosing to match the other
firm’s fixed factor level, they can solve endogenously the coordination problem. So, for
asymmetric profiles of that kind, firms have an incentive to deviate. Those strategy
profiles cannot be Nash equilibria of the first stage game. b) If we are in the case
(z˜ 6 zh 6= z
∗), the equilibrium of the second stage is characterized by the Corollary
2-B. The profit of the firm h is characterized by the function Π∗(zh). Thus, the firm
h has an incentive to deviate getting closer to z∗, the fixed factor level that maximises
Π∗(z). Those strategy profiles cannot be Nash equilibria of the first stage game. c) If
we are in the case (zl < zh = z
∗), the firm h has no incentive to deviate. Because of the
definition of p∗, we have ∂πˆ(p∗(z), z)/∂p = 0. Because z∗ > z˜, we have p∗(z∗) > p¯(z∗)
and thus because ∂2πˆ(p, z)/∂p2 < 0 we have ∂πˆ(p¯(z∗), z∗)/∂p > ∂πˆ(p∗(z∗), z∗)/∂p = 0.
According to the definition of z∗, we have dΠ(z∗)/dz = 0. Using equation (6b), and
the fact that dp¯(z)/dz < 0, we deduce that ∂πˆ(p¯(z∗), z∗)/∂z > 0. Finally, because
zl < z
∗ and ∂2πˆ(p, z)/∂z2 < 0, we have ∂πˆ(p¯(z∗), zl)/∂z > 0. This last expression
characterizes the effect of an increase in z on the profit of l (i.e. there is no price effect,
only the cost effect). It implies that the firm l has always an incentive to deviate by
increasing its level of fixed factor. Those strategy profiles cannot be Nash equilibria of
the first stage game. a), b) and c) characterize all the possible asymmetric profiles of
the first stage game and proves step 1.
Step 2: (z∗, z∗) is a Nash Equilibrium of the first stage game.
If a firm unilaterally decide to increase its level of fixed factor to z+ > z
∗, it will become
the only firm with the high level of fixed factor. Its profit will be Π∗(z+). But, because
Π∗(z) reach it’s maximum in z∗, we necessarily have Π∗(z∗) > Π∗(z+). Firms have
no interest to unilaterally increase the level of the fixed factor. If a firm unilaterally
decides to decrease its level of fixed factor to z− < z
∗, its profit will be πˆ(p¯(z∗), z−).
We have demonstrate in step 1c that ∀z < z∗, ∂πˆ(p¯(z∗), z)/∂z > 0. Thus, we have
πˆ(p¯(z∗), z−) < πˆ(p¯(z
∗), z∗). That proves step 2. Firms have no interest to unilaterally
decrease the level of the fixed factor. That ends the proof of step 2.
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Step 3: (z∗, z∗) dominates all the other symmetric strategy profiles of the first stage
game.
With the same reasoning as in the preceding steps, it can easily be demonstrated that
for ”small” ǫ, (z∗ + ǫ, z∗ + ǫ) are also Nash equilibria of the game. But because all the
Nash equilibria belong to the set of the symmetric strategy profiles and, because, in
the symmetric cases, the firms earn Π(z), when z∗ > z˜, z∗ maximise Π(z) and thus
(z∗, z∗) is payoff dominant.
Let’s turn now to Proposition 3 ii).
Step 1’: Asymmetric strategy profiles cannot be Nash equilibria of the first stage
game. Case a) If we are in the case (zl < zh < z˜), the reasoning is exactly same
as in step 1 a). b) If we are in the case (z˜ < zh), the equilibrium of the second
stage is characterized by the Corollary 2-B. The profit of the firm h is characterized
by the function Π∗(zh). Thus, the firm h has an incentive to deviate getting closer
to z˜ (Π∗(z) is strictly decreasing for z > z˜). Those profiles cannot be Nash equi-
libria of the first stage game. c) If we are in the case (zl < zh = z˜). Let’s define
z# = argmax{πˆ(p¯(z˜), z)}, the optimal level of the fixed factor for the firm l,when
zh = z˜. Because of the concavity according to z of the function πˆ and the fact that,
when z∗ < z˜, ∂πˆ(p¯(z˜), z˜)/∂z < 0, we have z# < z˜. We can distinguish two sub-
cases. c1) If zl 6= z
#, then the firm l has an incentive to deviate, choosing z#. c2) If
zl = z
#, we can show that the firm h has an incentive to deviate, choosing z#, because
Π∗∗(z#) > Π∗∗(z˜) = Π∗(z˜). For proving that, we have to notice that by definition of z#,
∂πˆ(p¯(z˜), z#)/∂z = 0. z# < z˜ ⇒ p∗(z#) > p∗(z˜), and thus because ∂2πˆ(p, z)/∂p∂z < 0,
we get ∂πˆ(p∗(z#), z#)/∂z < ∂πˆ(p∗(z˜), z#)/∂z = ∂πˆ(p¯(z˜), z#)/∂z = 0. It implies that,
due to the strict concavity of the profit function Π∗∗ is strictly decreasing between z#
and z˜ and thus, Π∗∗(z#) > Π∗∗(z˜). Those profiles cannot be Nash equilibria of the first
stage game. a), b) c1) and c2) characterize all the possible asymmetric profiles of the
first stage game and proves step 1’ 7.
Step 2’: (z∗∗, z∗∗) is a Nash Equilibrium of the first stage game.
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If one of the two firms choose to unilaterally deviate, two cases are possible. If it
chooses z < z˜, the equilibria of the second stage are characterized by the Corollary
2-C. We go back to the coordination problem and the firm has no incentive to do that.
If the firm chooses z > z˜, it will become the only firm with the high level of fixed
factor. Its profit will be Π(z). But, because Π(z) reaches its maximum in z∗∗, the firm
has no incentive to do that.
Step 3’: (z∗∗, z∗∗) dominates all the other symmetric strategy profiles of the first stage
game.
If we define z˜− such that z˜− < z∗∗ and Π(z˜−) = Π(z˜), then all symmetric profiles
(z, z) such that z ∈ [z˜−, z˜] are Nash equilibria of the game. In those cases, the firms
have no incentive to unilaterally deviate choosing z′ < z˜, because the equilibrium of
the second stage is characterized by corollary 2-C, and we are back to the coordination
problem. Firms have also no incentive to unilaterally deviate choosing z′ > z˜ because
Π(z) > Π(z′).
Because all the Nash Equilibria belongs to the set of symmetric strategy profiles,
(z∗∗, z∗∗) is the only payoff dominant Nash Equilibrium of the game.
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Notes
1See Vives (1999), section 5.1, pp 117-123.
2Other extensions with mixed-strategy equilibria and positive profit levels are pro-
vided by Baye and Morgan (1999), Kaplan and Wettstein (2000) and Hoernig (2002).
3In the sense of Aumann (1976), cf Harsanyi and Selten (1988) p. 359. There is
a huge literature on equilibrium selection in games, see Cooper et al. (1990), for an
introduction.
4For simplicity, we will use a Cobb-Douglas production function, but what deter-
mines our results is the convexity of the short term marginal cost which depends on
the decreasing marginal productivity of the variable factor, a universal assumption in
economics. Our results do not depend on the specification of the production function.
5Our model provides foundations for the notion of non-rigid capacity constraint
introduced by Chowdhury (2009) directly in the cost function.
6Dixon (1986) considers the same structure for the production function (case b).
However the price setting in the second stage differs from ours.
7For a specific value of α, we have z∗ = z∗∗ = z# = z˜. In this case zl = z
# = z˜ = zh
is not an asymmetric outcome.
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